Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking by Hikaru Ogawa & David Wildasin
 
 IFIR WORKING PAPER SERIES   
 
 
Think Locally, Act Locally:  Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient 
Decentralized Policymaking*  
 
Hikaru Ogawa 





IFIR Working Paper No. 2007-06 
 
 
First version June, 2003 




*The first version of this paper was prepared while Ogawa was visiting the Martin School 
of Public Policy at the University of Kentucky, on leave from Nagoya University. Initial 











IFIR Working Papers are made available for purposes of academic discussion.  The views 
expressed are those of the author(s), for which IFIR takes no responsibility. 
 
(c) Hikaru Ogawa and David E. Wildasin.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to 
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, 
including (c) notice, is given to the source. 
 





In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional 
spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions 
that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction’s emissions depend upon the local 
stock of private capital. Capital is interjurisdictionally-mobile and may be taxed 
to help finance local public expenditures. We show that decentralized policymaking 
leads to efficient resource allocations in important cases, even in the complete absence of 
corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through 
Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies 
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*Corresponding author 1 Introduction
Urbanization, industrialization, and other economic activities produce greenhouse gas emis-
sions that aﬀect the earth’s atmosphere and thus may produce important external eﬀects.
These and similar externalities create a presumption that decentralized policymaking is likely
to produce socially ineﬃcient outcomes, as individual jurisdictions – nations or subnational
governments – neglect the spillover beneﬁts created by their policies. Although we do not
doubt the validity of such concerns in general, the following analysis shows that there is more
to the story. National and subnational governments do not exist in economic isolation from
the rest of the world. In particular, as we will show, the linkages that arise from decentralized
competition for capital investment or other productive resources alter the incentives facing
decentralized policymakers. Even when externalities are truly global in nature, completely
decentralized policymaking may lead to socially-eﬃcient outcomes.
In stating the key theme and distinguishing feature of our analysis so directly, we do not
wish to claim more than is justiﬁed. As will become clear, decentralized policymaking in the
presence of interjurisdictional spillovers may indeed produce ineﬃcient outcomes in certain
circumstances. A number of remedies are available with which to manage positive or negative
external eﬀects, whether they stem from pollution or from other causes. These include Pigou-
vian taxes and subsidies (Pigou 1920), Coasian bargaining (Coase (1960), Stigler (1966)), the
folk theorem of repeated interactions (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)), and other incentive
mechanisms, e.g. Clarke (1971), Groves and Ledyard (1977), and Varian (1994) among oth-
ers. Under appropriate circumstances, each of these oﬀers some hope that externality-based
ineﬃciencies may be mitigated or avoided altogether.
At the same time, however, we realize the limitations of these prescriptions. In the context
of global environmental problems, for instance, no global authority has the power to imple-
ment corrective taxes or subsidies. Countries are far from symmetric, both spatially and
temporally, implying that the folk theorem cannot provide us much hope in reality. Coasian
1bargaining may not be completely hopeless, since nations can and do enter into treaties with
one another, but treaty negotiation and enforcement processes are obviously cumbersome
and far from costless. This is especially true when the externalities in question, such as those
arising from the emissions of greenhouse gases, are truly global in nature. These externalities
aﬀect literally every nation and negotiations with very large numbers of countries are highly
complex and costly. The impasse over the ratiﬁcation and implementation of the “Kyoto
protocol” illustrates this problem.
Recognizing that there may be no perfect solutions to externality problems, it is all the more
important to understand thoroughly the underlying nature of external eﬀects in particular
cases and verify precisely how ineﬃciencies may arise. The present paper focuses on the
problem of multijurisdictional externalities associated with industrialization, urbanization,
and economic development. An important theme in the literature of ﬁscal competition,
exempliﬁed by a well-known paper by Oates and Schwab (1988), is that both ﬁscal and
regulatory instruments inﬂuence the amount and location of such externality-producing ac-
tivities.1 In some cases, depending on the range of available instruments and on informational
and other constraints, competitive pressures may lead governments to control pollution or
other externalities eﬃciently, with the important proviso that these eﬀects do not spill over
jurisdictional boundaries. When there are interjurisdictional spillovers, the literature consis-
tently ﬁnds, as intuition would suggest, that decentralized policymaking produces socially
ineﬃcient outcomes.
In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers
among heterogeneous jurisdictions and in which it nevertheless is the case that decentral-
1The literature on competition is reviewed, e.g., by Wilson (1999), Zodrow (2003), Wildasin and Wilson
(2004); see these papers for additional references. The interaction between decentralized regulation and
ﬁscal policymaking, emphasized by Oates and Schwab, arises in a diﬀerent context in the literature of “ﬁscal
zoning.” See Hamilton (1975) and, for a more comprehensive treatment with many additional references,
Fischel (2001). Studies that examine ﬁscal competition and spillovers include Wellisch (1994), Glazer (1999),
Kunce and Shogren (2002), and Cremer and Gahvari (2004). See Wilson (1997) for a review and further
references.
2ized policymaking may lead to eﬃcient resource allocations, even in the complete absence
of corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through
Coasian bargaining. We emphasize that decentralized policymaking can still result in glob-
ally eﬃcient allocations even when the preferences and production technologies diﬀer among
jurisdictions and governments only have information, and only care, about local environmen-
tal impacts. Our analysis exploits an admittedly stylized but very standard model of tax
competition as its fundamental analytical tool. Transboundary pollution provides a useful
illustrative example of the interjurisdictional spillovers that are the focus of our analysis, but
the application of our model is not restricted to environmental issues. As we discuss brieﬂy
in the conclusion, the results of our analysis can be applied to many kinds of spillover issues,
such as positive externalities associated with the development of human capital.
2 The Model
We begin by describing the model in its simplest form, deferring discussion of various gen-
eralizations until later. The basic model follows the canonical tax competition model with
mobile capital and capital-related externalities, pioneered by Oates and Schwab (1988), with
which some readers may be familiar.
2.1 Preferences, Technologies, and Endowments
Preferences. In this model, there are N jurisdictions, within each of which a single repre-
sentative agent resides. This agent consumes a composite private good, denoted by xi for
jurisdiction i, a local public good gi, both of which are goods, and also suﬀers from environ-
mental damage ei, which is a bad.2 The utility of the household residing in jurisdiction i is
2The variable gi may be interpreted as a vector, so that the model allows for an arbitrary number of local
public goods.
3denoted ui(xi,gi,ei), with uix > 0, uig > 0, and uie < 0, where uix represents the marginal
utility of the private good and uig and uie are interpreted similarly. Furthermore, the sign
restriction on uie is inessential; if uie > 0, then commodity e is interpreted as a local envi-
ronmental “good” rather than a bad. We discuss other possible examples later, but for now
continue with the interpretation of ei as environmental damage, a bad. Note that preferences
may diﬀer across jurisdictions; we do not assume that preferences are homogeneous.
Production technologies. Perfectly competitive private ﬁrms produce the composite private
good in each jurisdiction. The production process uses capital, with ki the amount of capital
employed in locality i. There is at least one immobile input to the production process,
such as labor, land, or other (privately owned) natural resources (forests, minerals, etc.)
The amounts of all of these inputs are treated as ﬁxed (in particular, we abstract from
labor/leisure tradeoﬀs and treat the size of the local labor force as exogenously given), so
that local production can be written simply as fi(ki). We assume a well-behaved neoclassical
production function exhibiting constant returns to scale in all inputs, so that there are no
pure proﬁts (or, equivalently, pure proﬁts are the return to one of the immobile factors
of production), with fi increasing and strictly concave in the amount of capital; letting
subscripts denote partial derivatives, this means that fik > 0 > fikk. Note that production
functions may diﬀer across jurisdictions; we do not assume that technologies are identical.
Public goods and environmental spillovers. The public good gi in each jurisdiction is produced
using the all-purpose private good; each unit of gi requires one unit of this good. Public
goods do not play a crucial role in the analysis and are included for the sake of generality
and for comparison with environmental or other externalities.
Externalities do of course play a crucial role in the analysis. Environmental damage is linked
to the use of the capital input: each unit of capital employed in jurisdiction i results in e in a
units of environmental damage there. In addition, the use of capital in jurisdiction i causes
environmental damage in other jurisdictions, that is, there are environmental spillovers. The
4degree of spillover is captured by a parameter β, with β ∈ [0,1], so that




When β = 0, environmental quality in any one jurisdiction depends only on local economic
activity. In this case, our model reduces to that of Oates and Schwab (1988). If β is
positive, local economic activity (as represented by the level of capital, ki) causes damage
not only to the local environment but in other jurisdictions as well; a low value of β means
that these environmental spillovers are small. The upper limit of β = 1 corresponds to
complete or perfect spillovers, where a unit of capital employed in jurisdiction i does just
as much damage elsewhere as it does locally. By allowing for interjurisdictional spillovers,
our model generalizes that of Oates and Schwab (1988) and others who have used similar
models. Note that we do assume that the degree of environmental spillover is the same for all
jurisdictions; the implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed later. Phenomena
such as greenhouse gas emissions correspond to the case β = 1: a ton of CO2 emissions
circulates and mixes uniformly throughout the atmosphere, no matter what its source.
Endowments. Let ¯ ki denote the the amount of this stock with which jurisdiction i is endowed.
We assume that capital is freely mobile among jurisdictions and ﬁxed in supply to the







This means that any one jurisdiction may import (ki > ¯ kk) or export (¯ ki > ki) capital. Note
that endowments may diﬀer across jurisdictions; we do not assume that endowments are
identical.
Note for future reference that (1) and (2) imply that
ei = aki + aβ(¯ k − ki) (3)
where ¯ k ≡
P
i ¯ ki is the aggregate capital stock.
52.2 Institutions
The government in each jurisdiction controls public policy instruments – taxes and expen-
ditures. Other resource allocation decisions are made by private-sector agents operating in
competitive markets.
The composite private good that is produced and consumed in each jurisdiction is assumed
to be tradable and is chosen as numeraire. Thus, the total value of production in locality
i is fi(ki). The gross return per unit of capital is thus fik(ki), and the total return to the
immobile factors of production, owned by the local resident, is fi(ki)−kifik(ki). In addition,
households receive income from their endowments of capital and also pay a lump-sum tax
Ti to the local government. Denoting the net return to capital by ρ, the private good
consumption of the household in jurisdiction i is thus
xi = fi(ki) − fikki + ρ¯ ki − Ti. (4)
In addition to a local lump-sum tax, the government in each jurisdiction has at its disposal
a (source) tax on mobile capital. As a matter of notational convenience, the tax on capital ti
is interpreted as a per-unit tax, although it could equivalently be modeled as an ad valorem
tax on the value of capital such as a property tax or as a source-based tax on capital income,
such as a corporation income tax.3 The government budget constraint requires that tax
revenues are equal to government expenditures on the local public good,
gi = Ti + tiki. (5)
Capital mobility means that the net rate of return must be the same in every jurisdiction in
equilibrium, i.e.,
fik − ti = ρ ∀i. (6)
3Although the precise speciﬁcation of the form of taxation is sometimes important in the analysis of
strategic tax competition, this is not the case in the present context since we assume that each jurisdiction
is small relative to the capital market and we may thus specify a per-unit tax without loss of generality.
6This system of equations, together with the capital-market clearing condition (2), determines
the equilibrium allocation of capital and the equilibrium net rate of return ρ as functions of
the vector of capital tax rates t ≡ (t1,...,tn).
2.3 Decentralized Policy Equilibrium
We assume that governments choose their policies to maximize the equilibrium level of utility
of their residents. Each government is assumed to be small in the sense that it treats
the economy-wide net return to capital ρ and the policy choices of other governments as
exogenously given. This means that the government in jurisdiction i expects that its choice
of the capital tax rate ti will aﬀect the local capital stock ki because the local gross rate of
return on capital fik must be suﬃciently high to insure that fik − ti = ρ. This equation can
be solved implicitly for ki(ti), with dki/dti = 1/fikk < 0.
Although the individual jurisdictions are assumed to act atomistically in choosing their
policies, this does not mean that they ignore the eﬀects of their policy choices on externality
spillovers. When jurisdiction i changes its tax rate on capital, it knows that there will be
less environmental damage from local economic activity because ki will fall. However, the
capital that leaves one locality does not disappear altogether from the economy, it merely
relocates to other jurisdictions. Indeed, substituting ki(ti) into (3), one obtains
dei
dti




In other words, each jurisdiction, though acting atomistically, and without knowledge of
the precise general equilibrium reallocation of capital that results from its own tax policy,
nevertheless recognizes that inﬂows or outﬂows of capital do not correspond to the creation
or destruction of capital itself.
Using the government budget constraint (5) to solve for Ti and substituting into (4), we get
xi = fi(ki) − kifik(ki) + ρ¯ ki − gi + tiki. (8)
7Having thus eliminated Ti from the system, the problem facing the government in jurisdiction
i is to choose two policy instruments, gi and ti, to maximize u(xi,ei,gi), taking ρ as given
and taking into account the eﬀect of the local capital tax on the equilibrium value of the
local capital stock and thus on local environmental quality (via (3)) and on local private
good consumption (via (8)).









The ﬁrst of these conditions is the Samuelson condition for eﬃcient local public expenditures;
since local governments can raise as much revenue as desired through lump-sum taxation, the
Samuelson condition is naturally expected to be satisﬁed. The second condition shows how
governments tax mobile capital. This tax is imposed at a positive rate if local residents value
environmental quality, since then uie < 0 (strictly). However, governments also take into
account the fact that some proportion β of the local environmental damage that is avoided
by driving capital out of their own jurisdictions will “spill back” when capital relocates
elsewhere.4
2.4 Eﬃcient Resource Allocation
In order to evaluate the eﬃciency properties of the decentralized policy-setting equilibrium
just described it is necessary to characterize a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of resources, that
is, a solution to the problem
max<(xi,gi,ki)>u1(x1,g1,e1)
4To assume that governments take “spill back” eﬀects into account does not require that they monitor
the sources of these eﬀects, which are irrelevant. Furthermore, taking these eﬀects into account is not a
departure from the assumption of atomistically competitive competition among governments. Spillovers,
and thus spillbacks, arise from the fundamental technology of pollution, as speciﬁed in (3).
8subject to




i(xi + gi) = 0, (12)
(1), and (2).
























The ﬁrst of these is again the Samuelson condition for eﬃcient local public expenditure. The
second condition characterizes the eﬃcient allocation of capital, taking into account both
the productivity of capital and the impact of the capital allocation on local environmental
damage and on spillovers. At the margin, a unit of capital must be equally productive in all
locations, net of the environmental damage that is causes in its own location and, through
spillover eﬀects, in other locations.
2.5 The Eﬃciency of Decentralized Policymaking
It is immediately apparent that the equilibrium conditions (6), (9), and (10) correspond to
the eﬃciency conditions (13) and (14) when there are no spillovers, i.e., when β = 0. In this
case, each government’s local capital tax provides an instrument with which to control the
extent of local environmental damage, while the lump-sum tax provides an eﬃcient source
of local ﬁnance for public expenditures. Thus, our analysis conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Oates
and Schwab (1988) for the case where our model reduces to theirs, that is, when there are
no interjurisdictional spillover eﬀects.
9Remarkably, the same result holds even when there are spillover eﬀects:
Proposition 1: The equilibrium allocation of resources in a system with decentralized
policymaking is ﬁrst-best Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof: Adding and subtracting βuie/uix to the left-hand side of the eﬃciency condition
(14), and similarly adding and subtracting βuje/ujx on the right-hand side, it is clear that
(14) is satisﬁed if and only if
 



































But (6) and (10) imply that this condition is indeed satisﬁed in equilibrium; furthermore, the
Samuelson condition (13) for eﬃcient public good provision is also satisﬁed in equilibrium,
as shown in (9).5
Thus, even though each local government (i) chooses policies that represent the interests
only of their local resident(s), (ii) is unaware of the amount of damage that local economic
activity causes in other jurisdictions (recall that there are no symmetry assumptions re-
garding preferences, technologies, or endowments, and thus no local government i knows
the valuation uje/ujx placed on environmental damage in any other jurisdiction j 6= i), and
(iii) does not communicate, bargain, or coordinate policies with other local governments,
the process of decentralized policymaking produces Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes for the entire
system of jurisdictions. To achieve eﬃcient resource allocation in this economy with envi-
ronmental spillovers, it is necessary neither to have a benevolent Pigovian “visible” hand, for
example in the form of a higher-level government that imposes corrective taxes on spillovers,
5To be precise, the correspondence of ﬁrst-order conditions does not establish that decentralized equilibria
are eﬃcient; this is necessary but not suﬃcient. In this simple model, however, standard assumptions on
preferences and technologies guarantee that the necessary conditions are also suﬃcient.
10nor to have a somewhat “less visible” hand, for example in the form of a system of treaties
or contractually-ﬁxed compensatory payments resulting from a Coasian negotiation, that
internalize damages resulting from spillovers. This is true whether the spillover eﬀects, as
measured by the parameter β, are small or large, and possibly even “global,” corresponding
to the case where β = 1.
Indeed, since the analysis places no restrictions even on the sign of the local valuation of
environmental damage uie/uix, it is possible that there are “asymmetric” externalities in
the sense that residents in some jurisdictions may be indiﬀerent to environmental quality
(uie/uix = 0), others regard environmental damage as very harmful (uie/uix << 0), and
still others view it (for some odd reason) as positively desirable (uie/uix >> 0). (Indeed,
Stern (2007, Section 3.3) notes that modest global warming may produce some beneﬁts in
northern regions even as it harms other regions.)
Qualiﬁcations. Proposition 1 is derived within the context of a model that is very general in
some respects, but of course it does depend on other assumptions that are less general. For
example, one could imagine that the amount of environmental damage produced per unit of
investment in a given jurisdiction might diﬀer: instead of some ﬁxed amount of damage a
that is the same for all jurisdictions, there might be climatic, topographical, or regulatory
variations among jurisdictions such that the amount of damage caused by each unit of
capital in jurisdiction i is an amount ai, not necessarily the same in all places. Furthermore,
the amount of “physical” spillover from one jurisdiction to another might not be the same
proportion β for all jurisdictions; instead, there could be a parameter βij that describes the
amount of pollution transmitted (by air, water, etc.) from jurisdiction i to jurisdiction j
which could vary across all i and j. In these cases, the proof of Proposition 1 is no longer
valid.
Furthermore, the externalities that we have analyzed are not the only conceivable form
of externalities. For example, jurisdictions might derive spillover externalities from public
11expenditures undertaken by others; in one simple polar case. One might assume, for instance,
that the utility in jurisdiction i depends not on gi alone but on the total amount of public
spending in all jurisdictions
P
j gj, in eﬀect producing a “voluntary contributions” model of
local public good provision (see, e.g., Boadway et al. (1989)).
Nevertheless, Proposition 1 is still a striking result, and it should be apparent that the mag-
nitude of the eﬃciency losses from decentralized policymaking is modest if the assumptions
of the model are approximately correct. For example, suppose that we generalize the model
to let βij represent the amount of environmental damage suﬀered in j per unit of damage
in i. The Samuelson condition for eﬃcient public expenditure continues to be satisﬁed in
the decentralized equilibrium while the equilibrium allocation of capital will no longer be
eﬃcient: ki will be ineﬃciently high in some jurisdictions and ineﬃciently low in others. The
equilibrium allocation of capital in the model would be continuous in the parameters βij,
however, converging to the eﬃcient allocation as the spillover parameters approach a com-
mon value ( βij → β). The key point is that spillovers themselves do not imply any necessary
departure from eﬃciency in decentralized policymaking, even when there are potentially very
substantial asymmetries among the preferences, technologies, and endowments of diﬀerent
jurisdictions. The eﬃciency rationale for intervention in local decisionmaking by a higher-
level authority, or for explicit coordination and bargaining among local governments, must
rest not on the “ﬁrst-order” existence of spillovers but on the “second-order” diﬀerences in
the amounts of spillover damage from one jurisdiction to another (i.e., not on the fact that
βij > 0 but on the fact that βij 6= βkl for some i,j,k.l).
123 Extensions and Interpretations
3.1 Many Mobile Resources
The model in Section 2 assumes that “capital” is the only resource that is mobile among
jurisdictions. Here, we extend the model to allow for M distinct types of mobile resources.
This is not merely a formal generalization. The second part of this section discusses interpre-
tations and applications of the analysis for which this generalization is crucial. To anticipate
some of these interpretations, one might suppose that nonhuman capital is mobile among
regions but that human capital, or labor of diﬀerent types, is also mobile, and that there are
some externalities, positive or negative, associated with diﬀerent types of labor.6
The basic setup and notation of the previous section can be preserved here. We change




and similarly for other M-vectors. We assume that each government can impose taxes (or
subsidies) at diﬀerent rates, as desired, on mobile resources. Thus, ti is also a vector of
dimension M. Each type of mobile resource may give rise to a diﬀerent type of externality,
with em
i the externality associated with the mobile resource of type m in jurisdiction i; the
parameters am and βm are speciﬁc to each type of mobile resource, which means that some
of them may not give rise to any spillover eﬀects at all (βm = 0) while others do (βm > 0).
Thus, (1) is now interpreted to mean that the m-th component of the vector ei is given
by em
i = amkm
i + βm P
j6=i km
j . The vector ei enters the utility function ui(xi,gi,ei) in a
general way; in particular, some “externalities” may be zero (um
ie = 0, where the superscript
identiﬁes the m-th mobile resource) while others may be positive or negative, and the sign
and magnitudes of these eﬀects may diﬀer among jurisdictions. In the special case where
diﬀerent types of mobile resources produce the same kinds of external eﬀects, the external
6To forestall possible confusion, let us note that it is still important for the analysis that the “representative
agent” in each jurisdiction is immobile and that local policies are chosen to maximize the utility of this agent,
so we do not necessarily suggest that the model accommodates the case where all people are mobile. See
further discussion in the next subsection.
13eﬀects enter the utility function as perfect substitutes (thus, for example, diﬀerent types of
resources may result in noise pollution, and the decibels of noise associated with each type
are simply added up to determine the total amount of noise that aﬀects consumer welfare).
As in Section 2, the total stock of each mobile resource in the economy as a whole is taken as
exogenously ﬁxed. The vector of equilibrium net rates of return for these resources is denoted
by ρ. As before, the equilibrium amount of each mobile resource located in jurisdiction i
must satisfy (6), which is now a system of M equations that, together with the M equations
(2), determine the equilibrium values of the M + NM variables (ρ,k1,...,kN).
The government and household budget constraints take the same forms as before, and each
jurisdiction chooses its tax and public expenditure policies taking as given the net rate
of return on mobile resources, but recognizing that its tax policies aﬀect the incentive for
mobile resource owners to locate within its boundaries. The impact of local taxes on the
allocation of mobile resources is now somewhat more complex than before because the entire
vector of mobile resources enters the production function fi(ki) with no restrictions as to
substitutability/complementarity among these inputs. Thus, a change in jurisdiction i’s tax
rate on mobile resource m, tm
i will, in general, aﬀect the entire vector ki. Let FiKK denote the
matrix [∂2fi/∂km
i ∂km0]. This matrix is negative deﬁnite because fi(ki) is strictly concave.
Using the implicit function theorem to solve the system (6) for the vector ki(ti), treating ρ
















iKK denotes the cofactor of the (m,m0) element in FiKK. It follows from the concavity
of fi that ∂km
i /∂tm
i < 0, but the cross-eﬀects of taxes on employment of mobile inputs
∂km
i /∂tm0
i , for m 6= m0, may in general be of either sign, or zero.


















where a(1 − β) is the vector (am(1 − βm)). Letting uie now represent the vector (um
ie), it
follows that the solution to government i’s problem of choosing a vector of tax rates ti and
public expenditures gi to maximize utility for the representative resident of jurisdiction i is















, m = 1,...,M. (19)
Condition (18) is just the Samuelson condition for local public expenditures once again,
while (19) is a system of M equations that simultaneously characterize the locality’s choice









and indeed (20) must necessarily hold at a solution to jurisdiction i’s optimization problem
since the M × M matrix [∂ki/∂ti] must be of full rank.7 Thus, Section 2’s characterization
of a locality’s choice of the tax rate on mobile resources, (10), can be interpreted as a
characterization of the vector of tax rates applied to each of many diﬀerent mobile resources.
The characterization of the eﬃcient allocation of resources is essentially no diﬀerent in the
case where there are many mobile resources rather than just one. Once again, the Samuelson
condition for eﬃcient local public expenditures must hold, while the condition for eﬃcient



























∀i,j and ∀m. (21)
7This follows from the strict concavity of the production function fi.
15Using exactly the same method of proof, it is now apparent that Proposition 1 can be
extended to the case of M mobile resources.
3.2 Productivity Spillovers
It is sometimes argued that FDI promotes productivity growth through positive production
externalities, for instance, because multinational enterprises may possess superior produc-
tion technology and management techniques [Blomstrom and Kokko (1998)]. On the other
hand, production externalities may arise, possibly in attenuated from, from knowledge or
other spillovers that do not depend on the co-location of production activities. As an ex-
tension of the earlier analysis, let us consider alternative model in which capital investment
produces positive spillovers. Although it certainly does not represent all conceivable types
of production externalities, this extension does clearly show that production externalities
do not necessarily result in ineﬃcient outcomes; in particular, the key ﬁndings in Section 2
continue to hold.
We continue to use the basic setup and notation of Section 2. Assume that the production
function is now given by fi(Ki), where Ki ≡ ki + α
P
j6=i kj, thus incorporating an inter-
jurisdictional production externality parameterized by α. (Intrajurisdictional spillovers are
subsumed within the local production function.) As α → 0, the spillover eﬀect becomes
weaker and ultimately vanishes. In the presence of such spillover eﬀects, ineﬃciencies might
arise because individual governments would not take into account the fact that their policies
inﬂuence productivity in other locations.
The equilibrium conditions (6) and (2) still hold in this model. Taking total derivatives of













ti = αfik > 0. (24)
The second condition reﬂects the fact that government i has an incentive to tax local invest-
ment. Substituting (24) into (6), we have
fik = ρ(1 − α)
−1 ∀i. (25)
Pareto eﬃcient allocation of mobile capital requires that
fik(1 − α) = µ/λ ∀i, (26)
where µ and λ are Lagrange multipliers. The equilibrium conditions with decentralized
policymaking imply that this condition is satisﬁed, and that the decentralized equilibrium
is therefore eﬃcient.
3.3 Applications and Interpretations
We now discuss several diﬀerent contexts in which the preceding results can be applied.
“Good” and “Bad” Industries. Many governments attempt to devise packages of ﬁscal (and
other) incentives to attract or retain “desirable” ﬁrms or industries. For example, a “desir-
able” industry could be one whose activities produce little pollution (a “clean” industry),
and an “undesirable” industry could be one that pollutes heavily. In both of these cases,
spillover eﬀects (or the lack thereof) can be an important characteristic of an industry’s
environmental impact. Some regions or countries (e.g., rich regions or ﬁrst-world countries)
may place a higher premium on environmental quality than others (e.g., poor regions or
third-world countries), for example because environmental quality is a normal good, leading
17them to tax dirty industries more heavily and causing some relocation of dirty industries
to other regions, a phenomenon sometimes described pejoratively as “ecological dumping.”
Since environmental damage may spill across jurisdictional boundaries, however, the ability
of any one jurisdiction to improve its environmental quality at the expense of others may
be limited. (In the extreme cases of global environmental phenomena such as global warm-
ing (attributable to greenhouse gas emissions) and ozone depletion (attributable to CFC
emissions), there is no way for any one jurisdiction to shift the burden of environmental
damage to some other location.) But by the same token, the apparent potential for “market
failure” seems to increase in such cases since individual jurisdictions (presumably) ignore
the spillover eﬀects that result from changes in the amount of pollution occurring within
their boundaries. Our analysis shows that decentralized competition for “clean” and “dirty”
industries can result in an eﬃcient spatial allocation of these activities even when individual
jurisdictions pay no attention at all to the impact of their decisions on the welfare of those
in other locations.
As previously remarked, the formal analysis presented above does not require that mobile
resources produce negative externalities; it is equally applicable in the case of positive exter-
nalities. It is sometimes claimed that some industries produce positive local spillovers because
they attract and employ highly educated staﬀ (scientists, medical personnel, economists (?))
whose presence in a region beneﬁt other residents. The range of such potential spillovers
(which are in any case not easily quantiﬁed) is very large and could include the potential
for the development of new ﬁrms, positive peer-group eﬀects on local educational systems,
lower crime rates, greater local product variety, etc. Not all of these potential spillovers can
be captured perfectly in our model, but their essential characteristic is that the presence of
these particular types of people beneﬁt existing residents of a jurisdiction – while, at the
same time, some of the local beneﬁts may spill over to other jurisdictions. Interpreting one
of the mobile resources in the model of the previous subsection to be, say, “highly educated
workers,” while other mobile resources represent various forms of non-human capital, one
18can see that decentralized competition for these desirable workers, or the ﬁrms or industries
that employ them, can result in a spatial allocation of externality-producing activities that
is eﬃcient from the viewpoint of the system as a whole.
Pollution Permits. In some cases, the total amount of pollution may be very closely linked
to the total stock of non-human capital, as in the Oates-Schwab tradition. More generally,
however, it might be possible vary the amount of pollution associated with a given level
of investment or production. In that case, additional policy instruments may be needed to
achieve an eﬃcient allocation of resources.
The use of tradable pollution permits as a means to control pollution has long attracted the
interest of economists and such permits are now used in the US and in the EU. As these
policies are usually conceived, an agency of a higher-level government, such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency in the US, might set an overall target level of (say) SO2 emissions
for the country as a whole, some overall target for NOx emissions, etc., and then proceed
to issue permits for these target amounts of pollution. This is already a challenging task
for the national government, but it is even more diﬃcult to determine the eﬃcient distribu-
tion of emissions among the 50 states and among thousands of local jurisdictions. And yet
the spatial distribution of emissions is very important because environmental damages are
not uniform throughout the nation. Equipped with information about local preferences for
pollution, and taking into account the interjurisdictional spillovers that are associated with
pollution emissions in any one location, the EPA could in principle ﬁnd the eﬃcient amount
of emissions for each locality in the US and then auction just that amount of permits in each
locality. In the absence of such information, trade in permits could conceivably produce an
equilibrium in which pollution is concentrated in localities where damages are high, a highly
ineﬃcient outcome.
Suppose, however, that localities are able to tax (or subsidize) the purchase of permits by
local ﬁrms in ways that reﬂect local preferences for environmental quality. By suitable rein-
19terpretation, the model presented above can be used to analyze the equilibrium of a system
in which a national authority determines an aggregate amount of tradable pollution permits
and in which market forces, coupled with decentralized tax/subsidy policies, determine the
spatial distribution of these permits and the associated pollution. Speciﬁcally, let ¯ k now
denote the aggregate amount of pollution to be permitted by the central authority, and let
ki denote the amount of pollution permits acquired by ﬁrms in jurisdiction i. The amount of
output in locality i is naturally assumed to be an increasing and concave function fi(ki) of
the amount of permits (and pollution) there; tradable permits in eﬀect transform pollution
into another marketed input in the production process. Assume that the national authority
distributes the proceeds from the sale of permits in a lump-sum fashion to the households in
the economy. This is equivalent to endowing the residents of each jurisdiction with ownership
rights to some amount ¯ ki of pollution permits. (The variables ¯ k, ki, etc. may be interpreted
as vectors, thus covering the case where there are many types of pollutants and pollution
permits.)
Provided that individual jurisdictions are free to tax or subsidize the local use of pollu-
tion permits, corresponding to ki in our model, Proposition 1 (or its generalization to the
many-mobile-resource case) implies that the equilibrium distribution of pollution among ju-
risdictions will be Pareto eﬃcient. In other words, in order to achieve an eﬃcient allocation
of resources, the national government need only determine the proper aggregate amount of
pollution ¯ k, leaving it to local jurisdictions to attract or repel polluting activities to whatever
degree best serves local interests. Local governments, in this case, use local information to
promote local interests, and in doing so they insure that the aggregate amount of pollution,
determined at the national level, is distributed eﬃciently among localities. This is true even
when environmental eﬀects spill over from one jurisdiction to another.
Pareto-Irrelevant Externalities. Our model demonstrates that if a unit of capital discharges
an equivalent amount of pollution in all regions, the externalities are completely internalized
through decentralized decision-making. Pareto-irrelevant externalities are also found in some
20previous research in which speciﬁc preference structures are utilized. As discussed in Myles
(1995), Osana (1972) shows that individual decision-making leads to eﬃcient equilibria in








i represents the consumption of good i(= 1,2)’s by individual k(=




2)ρh captures the externality eﬀects on individual h from individual j’s
consumption. Parks (1991) shows that these results generalize to the case where the utility
function has the form uh = uh[f1(x1),f2(x2),...,fH(xH)], where fk(k = 1,2,...,H) is the
“private utility” that individual k obtains from own-consumption. Of course, these results
do impose quite speciﬁc restrictions on preferences.
In our present model, the condition we need to achieve Pareto eﬃciency in decentralized
policy making is that one unit of capital discharges an equivalent amount of pollution in all
regions. Whether this condition holds or not is a matter of environmental technology. In
certain pollution cases, this condition might always hold in the chemical change (formula).
Furthermore, we might say that environmental technical transfer among countries is rele-
vant in the tax competing economy not only to improve environmental quality but also to
solve externality problems. Developed countries devised new techniques to control pollution
associated with rapid economic growth in the 1960-70s. Now these countries transfer envi-
ronment technology to the various developing countries. Their intent was merely to reduce
environmental pollution in those countries. However, we ﬁnd from our results that it has
side (but more important) eﬀects; it also improves the environment technological gap among
the countries, and that contributes to lead the decentralized equilibrium to Pareto eﬃciency.
4 Conclusion
The problem of spillover externalities is one that arises in many contexts. Environmental pol-
lution is one important example. It is natural to expect that spillovers, whether positive or
negative, may result in ineﬃcient resource allocation unless they are eﬀectively internalized
21through Coasian contracting or by corrective policies by a higher-level government. Indeed,
this possibility has long been known in the speciﬁc context of local public economics at least
since Williams (1966), which is just an application of a standard consumption-externality
framework to the issue of interjurisdictional spillovers, and it is emphasized throughout the
literature on “environmental federalism” (see, e.g., Oates (2002) for discussion and refer-
ences). The literature on global climate change, as exemplied by the recent Stern (2007)
report, highlights the importance of global environmental externalities and the need for
explicit international cooperation to internalize them.
The preceding analysis has shown, however, that there are important cases in which decen-
tralized policymaking can result in eﬃcient allocations of resources for an economic system.
We analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among hetero-
geneous jurisdictions and in which it nevertheless is the case that decentralized policymaking
leads to eﬃcient resource allocations – even in the complete absence of corrective interven-
tions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. A
critical feature of these models is that jurisdictions interact not only through pollution or
other spillovers, but through an integrated and competitive market for capital (in our base-
line model) or for some other resource linked to the production of spillover eﬀects, and that
governments are free to tax (or subsidize) this competitively-traded resource. Decentralized
taxation of freely-mobile capital or other resources is often seen as a source of interjurisdic-
tional ﬁscal externalities that give rise to allocative ineﬃciency (for discussion and references,
see, e.g., Wilson (1999) or Wilson and Wildasin (2004)). By contrast, in the present anal-
ysis, competition for mobile resources plays a crucial role in providing eﬃciency-enhancing
interjurisdictional linkages. Decentralized taxation is essential here; if governments were to
rely solely on other revenue sources, the competition allocation of capital would result in
equalization of capital productivity in all locations, an allocation that is generally ineﬃ-
cient when economic activity generates environmental or other externalities in a system of
heterogeneous jurisdictions.
22We do not wish to claim, and our analysis does not show, that decentralized policymaking
invariably leads to eﬃcient resource allocation. In particular, although our model is very
general in important respects, it must be noted that the eﬃciency results derived here do
rely on several simplifying assumptions. The results are not knife-edge results that disappear
with small departures from the underlying assumptions, but it is nonetheless true that the
results are unlikely to be of use in situations in which the key assumptions are only poorly
approximated.
References
Blomstrom M and A Kokko (1998), Multinational corporations and spillovers, Journal of
Economic Systems 12, 247-277.
Boadway R, Pestieau P and Wildasin D (1989), Non-Cooperative Behavior and Eﬃcient
Provision of Public Goods. Public Finance/Finances Publiques 44: 1-7.
Clarke EH (1971), Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice 11, 17-33.
Coase RH (1960), The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.
Cremer H and F Gahvari (2004), Environmental taxation, tax competition, and harmo-
nization, Journal of Urban economics 55, 21-45.
Fischel, W (2001), The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Inﬂuence Local Govern-
ment Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Fudenberg D and E Maskin (1986), The folk theorem for repeated games with discounting
and incomplete information, Econometrica 54, 533-554.
Glazer A (1999), Local regulation may be excessively stringent, Regional Science and Urban
Economics 29, 553-558.
23Groves T and J Ledyard (1977), Optimal allocation of public goods: a solution to the “free
rider” problem, Econometrica 45, 783-809.
Hamilton BW (1975), Zoning and property taxation in a system of local governments,
Urban Studies 12, 205-211.
Kunce M and JF Shogren (2002), On environmental federalism and direct emission control,
Journal of Urban Economics 51, 238-245.
Myles GD (1995), Public Economics, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Oates, WE (2002), A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in JA List and A
de Zeeuw (eds.), Recent Advances in Environmental Economics, Edward Elgar, Chel-
tenham.
Oates WE and RM Schwab (1988), Economic competition among jurisdictions: Eﬃciency
enhancing or distortion inducing?, Journal of Public Economics 35, 333-354.
Osana H (1972), Externalities and the basic theorem of welfare economics, Journal of
Economic Theory 4, 401-414.
Parks RP (1991), Pareto irrelevant externalities, Journal of Economic Theory 54, 165-179.
Pigou AC (1920), The Economics of Welfare, New York: Macmillan.
Stern N (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Stigler GJ (1966), The Theory of Price 3rd ed, New York: Macmillan.
Varian HR (1994), A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed,
American Economic Review 84, 1278-1293.
Wellisch D (1995), Locational choices of ﬁrms and decentralized
environmental policy with various instruments, Journal of Urban
24Economics 37, 290-310.
Williams A (1966), Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Government,
Journal of Political Economy 74, 18-33.
Wilson JD (1997), Capital mobility and environmental standards: Is there a theoretical
basis for a race to the bottom?, Bhagwati J and EH Robert eds., Fair Trade and
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? vol. 1, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wilson JD (1999), Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal 52, 269-304.
Wilson, JD and DE Wildasin (2004), Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon? Journal of
Public Economics 88, 1065–1091 .
Zodrow RG (2003), Tax competition and tax coordination in the European Union, Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 10, 651-671.
25 
The IFIR Working Papers Series 
 
Other titles in the series: 
 
No. 2005-01: “MSA Location and the Impact of State Taxes on Employment and 
Population: A Comparison of Border and Interior MSA’s,” William H. Hoyt and J. 
William Harden. 
 
No. 2005-02:  “Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using 
Instrumental Variables,” Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve. 
 
No. 2005-03:  “The Dynamics of Municipal Fiscal Adjustment,” Thiess Buettner and 
David E. Wildasin. 
 
No. 2005-04:  “National Party Politics and Supranational Politics in the European Union:  
New Evidence from the European Parliament,” Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew Gabel, 
Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Montgomery and Rebecca Schambach. 
 
No. 2005-05:  “Fiscal Competition,” David E. Wildasin. 
 
No. 2005-06:  “Do Governments Sway European Court of Justice Decision-making?:  
Evidence from Government Court Briefs,” Clifford J. Carrubba and Matthew Gabel. 
 
No. 2005-07:  “The Assignment and Division of the Tax Base in a System of Hierarchical 
Governments,” William H. Hoyt. 
 
No. 2005-08:  “Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications 
for Equity, Efficiency, and Political Economy,” David E. Wildasin. 
 
No. 2006-01:  “State Government Cash and In-kind Benefits:  Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Transfers and Cross-Program Substitution,” James Marton and David E. Wildasin. 
 
No.  2006-02:  “Decentralization and Electoral Accountability:  Incentives, Separation, 
and Voter Welfare,” Jean Hindriks and Ben Lockwood. 
 
No.  2006-03:  “Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance,” Robin Boadway and 
Motohiro Sato. 
 
No.  2006-04:   “A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance,” Robin Boadway and Jean-
Francois Tremblay. 
 




No.  2006-06:  “The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals' Financing 
and Investment Decisions,” Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber, and 
Georg Wamser. 
No.  2006-07:  “Disasters: Issues for State and Federal Government Finances,” David E. 
Wildasin.  
 
No.  2006-08: “Tax competition, location, and horizontal foreign direct investment,” 
Kristian Behrens and Pierre M. Picard. 
 
No.  2006-09: “The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental 
transfers.  Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain,” Albert Solé-Ollé and Pilar 
Sorribas-Navarro. 
 
No.  2006-10:  “Reforming the taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, 
"Coopetition" in a Bottom-up Federation,” Marcel Gerard. 
 
No.  2006-11:  “The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union,” 
Jens Brøchner, Jesper Jensen, Patrik Svensson, and Peter Birch Sørensen. 
 
No.  2006-12:  “Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local 
taxes and spending,” Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk, Jørn Rattsø, and Hanna Ågren. 
 
No.  2006-13:  “Size and Soft Budget Constraints,” Ernesto Crivelli and Klaas Staalz. 
 
No.  2006-14:  “On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation,” Timothy 
Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout. 
 
No.  2006-15:  “Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition,” Christos Kotsogiannis 
and Robert Schwager. 
 
No.  2007-01:  “Disaster Policy in the US Federation: Intergovernmental Incentives and 
Institutional Reform,” David E. Wildasin. 
 
No.  2007-02:  “Local Government Finance in Kentucky:  Time for Reform?” David E. 
Wildasin. 
 
No.  2007-03:  “Davis v. Department of Revenue of Kentucky:  A Preliminary Impact 
Assessment,” Dwight Denison, Merl Hackbart, and Michael Moody. 
 
No.  2007-04:  “Medicaid Expenditures and State Budgets:  Past, Present, and Future,”  
James Marton and David E. Wildasin. 
 
No.  2007-05:  “Pre-Emption:  Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation,”  David 
E. Wildasin.  
No.  2007-06:  “Think Locally, Act Locally:  Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient 




IFIR Working Papers contain original research contributed by scholars affiliated with the 
Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations at the Martin School of Public 
Policy and Administration at the University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.  Visit the 
IFIR web site at http://www.ifigr.org to download IFIR Working Papers and for other 
information about IFIR. 